аЯрЁБс;ўџ ўџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ§џџџўџџџ ўџџџўџџџўџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџRoot Entryџџџџџџџџ РF†Йv€pёК€CompObjџџџџџџџџџџџџbWordDocumentџџџџџџџџ0*ObjectPoolџџџџ†ЪYspёК†ЪYspёКўџџџ ўџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџўџ џџџџ РFMicrosoft Word 6.0 Document MSWordDocWord.Document.6;ўџ ўџ р…ŸђљOhЋ‘+'Гй0а˜м D h Œ Адј @d ˆЌџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџC:\WINWORD\TEMPLATE\NORMAL.DOTCOMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS Emil Freund EmilмЅe-Р e0*&l&ll&l&l&l&l&Ж&Ж&Ж&Ж&Ж&Ж& Р&Ж&d)1а&а&а&а&а&а&а&а&э&я&я&я&'*(F)•)Tщ)Gd)l&а&а&а&а&а&d)а&l&l&а&а&а&а&а&а&l&а&l&а&э&€&”&"l&l&l&l&а&э&а&а&COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, SE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY NO. SJ-96-0047 THE HEARST CORPORATION, d/b/a WXVB-TV CHANNEL 5 & d/d/a NEW ENGLAND CABLE NEWS, WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, d/b/a WBZ-TV CHANNEL 4, SUNBEAM TELEVISION CORPORATION, d/b/a WHDH-TV CHANNEL 7 & RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION vs. JUSTICES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT MEMORANDUM OF DECISION Canon 3 (A) (7) of S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Code of Judicial Conduct, states the general rule that a judge shall permit broadcasting, television, and electronic recording by the news media of proceedings open to the public in a courtroom. Clause (a) of Canon 3 (A) (7) states that: “A judge may limit or temporarily suspend such news media coverage, if it appears that such coverage will create a substantial likelihood of harm to any person or other serious harmful consequence.” I construe that right to “limit” coverage to include a total limitation of coverage, if, but only if, the reasons for a finding of a substantial likelihood of harm or harmful consequence applies to the entire proceeding. The motion judge found that media coverage of the proceedings will be extensive. She noted the possibility of one or more jurors being exposed to prejudicial information and that the saturation of coverage will make it difficult for the court to control juror’s access to prejudicial information. I reject this reason as an adequate basis for limiting coverage of a trial by the electronic media. Instructions to the jury and the jurors’ adherence to those instructions must provide the protection. A juror’s seeing again what happened before him or her in the courtroom would not be as bad as a juror’s seeing, reading, and hearing comment and opinions about the evidence and the trial. The latter cannot be controlled by limiting television and radio coverage of the trial. I agree with the judge that “constant replay and analysis of every aspect of the trial” has potential to interfere with a juror’s ability to render a verdict based solely on the evidence at trial. The cure is jury adherence to the judge’s instructions not to watch, listen to, or read about the trial until the case is over. The judge stated other reasons for her decision to deny television coverage of the trial. The defendant has displayed disruptive behavior during court proceedings in attempting to communicate with the media. The presence of cameras in the courtroom, the judge concluded, might encourage the defendant “to continue to use the proceedings as a forum to air his views on abortion and other issues.” This special circumstance, not unique but relatively rare, is entitled to considerable weight. This problem of disruptive behavior applies throughout the trial. The concern about disruptive behavior is not speculative. The motion judge has witnessed such events in the course of pretrial proceedings at which electronic media were present. The judge also relied on the fact that media coverage would increase the risk of harm to material witnesses, surviving victims, and the families of the deceased victims. These people, the judge found, had justifiably heightened fears of harassment and physical attack by misguided viewers. This circumstance, where the case involves crimes apparently committed because of the defendant’s reaction to the performance of abortions, is entitled to weight in deciding whether to allow electronic recording that affects such people. The motion judge, however, did not spell out in detail why the concerns of these people required the entire proceeding to be closed to the electronic media. Electronic media may be denied the right to record trial proceedings only if that coverage will create a substantial likelihood of harm to someone or a substantial likelihood of a serious harmful consequence. The defendant and the prosecution both concur that such a substantial likelihood exists in this case, but neither each one alone nor both together can control the decision. The judge has made a specific finding of a substantial likelihood of harm to the defendant and his right to a fair trial. If that finding depends on the possibility of improper extra judicial influences on jurors, it cannot stand. Because it stands on the basis of other considerations, the judge’s conclusion is warranted. As a single justice I should not interfere with the judge’s ruling unless it was wrong as a matter of law or the judge abused her discretion. Because of the strong emotions and reactions that the “abortion” question generates in this country, as the circumstances of this very case demonstrates, because of the expressed concerns of persons who might be harmed, and because of the potential for disruptive behavior, the judge, after making necessary findings, did not abuse her discretion in concluding that the trial should be closed to electronic recording. I see no error of law in the judge’s rulings that requires or permits me to vacate her order. The controlling canon does not expressly oblige the judge to adopt the least restrictive means of achieving protection of the concerned witnesses and others. Implicitly, however, the rule requires a limitation or suspension of media coverage only to the extant necessary to eliminate the substantial likelihood of harm or other serious consequence. The electronic media have suggested procedures by which, in their view, the concerns of those people can be protected while not excluding the electronic media from the courtroom. The trial judge has discretion in such matters once the appropriate findings are made. See Boston Herald, Inc. v. Superior Court Dept. of the Trial Court, 421 Mass. 502, 507 n.8 (1995). There is no means of avoiding the possibility of disruptive behavior by the defendant through some less than total elimination of electronic recording. The threat will exist throughout the trial. The circumstances of People v. Simpson in California should not be permitted to influence the operation of our Massachusetts rule. I see no indication that it has in this case. It would be instructive to record electronically how an able Massachusetts judge conducts a high publicity trial, but in the circumstances the trail judge was warranted in her discretion in barring the electronic media from the courtroom in this case. The judge’s order is always open for reconsideration by her in light of this memorandum or if circumstances change. I emphasize that this case presents special circumstances that warrant the closing of the entire trial to the electronic media, in the judge’s discretion: an established pattern of disruptive conduct by the defendant and a basis for concluding that there is a substantial likelihood of harm to witnesses, surviving victims, and others. What I have said should be considered in the light of (1) a rule whose strong presumption is that no media will be excluded from the courtroom and (2) the necessity to make findings of fact that support the exemption stated in the relevant rule. A judgment shall be entered denying relief under G.L. c. 211, sect. 3. Herbert P. Wilkins Associate Justice February 1, 1996 аЯрЁБс;ўџ ўџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџSummaryInformation(џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ Freund@†uUњeёК@@†БЧPpёК@~mgMicrosoft Word 6.02џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ+,CVefWX\]|}”•ЈЉpqNOœ  }~./ѕі‡ˆ@A‘’‰ŠбвгдеўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ў Р! ўР! ў Р! ўР! ў Р! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ў Р! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! -ежзъќ§ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! K@ёџNormala c"A@ђџЁ"Default Paragraph Fontџџџџџџџџ џџ џџ џџœŽе Emil FreundA:\WILKINS.TXTџ@HP LaserJet 4/4MLPT1:HPPCL5EHP LaserJet 4/4M  Dзќџˆыб@ џXHP LaserJet 4/4M  Dзќџˆыб@ џX€NN€€NN1Times New Roman Symbol &Arial"ˆаhІNІ5ƒ$GCOMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS Emil Freund Emil FreundаЯрЁБс;ўџ ўџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџRoot Entryџџџџџџџџ РF†ж*vёК €CompObjџџџџџџџџџџџџbWordDocumentџџџџџџџџ"w*ObjectPoolџџџџ†ЪYspёК†ЪYspёКџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ§џџџўџџџўџџџ!ўџџџ#$%&'()*+,-./01234567ўџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџSummaryInformation(џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџўџџџ ўџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџўџ џџџџ РFMicrosoft Word 6.0 Document MSWordDocWord.Document.6;ўџ ўџ р…ŸђљOhЋ‘+'Гй0а˜м D h Œ Адј @d ˆЌ“•у0ўР! ўР! ўC:\WINWORD\TEMPLATE\NORMAL.DOTCOMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS Emil Freund Emil Freund@†uUњeёК@†љю§qёК@†ч vёК@Ф0‹Microsoft Word 6.03VGALOGO LGO `ŸЮVGAFIX FON `Ÿ…№SOUND DRV `ŸЯp MAIN CPL `ŸчWPDмЅe-Р ew*&l&ll&l&l&l&l&Ф&Ж&Ф&Ф&Ф&Ф& Ю&Ф&Ћ)1о&о&о&о&о&о&о&о&ћ&§&§&§&'8(T)м)T0*Gr)9l&о&о&о&о&о&r)о&l&l&о&о&о&о&о&о&l&о&l&о&ћ&€&”&"l&l&l&l&о&ћ&о&о&COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS SUFFOLK, SE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT FOR SUFFOLK COUNTY NO. SJ-96-0047 THE HEARST CORPORATION, d/b/a WXVB-TV CHANNEL 5 & d/d/a NEW ENGLAND CABLE NEWS, WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, d/b/a WBZ-TV CHANNEL 4, SUNBEAM TELEVISION CORPORATION, d/b/a WHDH-TV CHANNEL 7 & RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION vs. JUSTICES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT MEMORANDUM OF DECISION Canon 3 (A) (7) of S.J.C. Rule 3:09, Code of Judicial Conduct, states the general rule that a judge shall permit broadcasting, television, and electronic recording by the news media of proceedings open to the public in a courtroom. Clause (a) of Canon 3 (A) (7) states that: “A judge may limit or temporarily suspend such news media coverage, if it appears that such coverage will create a substantial likelihood of harm to any person or other serious harmful consequence.” I construe that right to “limit” coverage to include a total limitation of coverage, if, but only if, the reasons for a finding of a substantial likelihood of harm or harmful consequence applies to the entire proceeding. The motion judge found that media coverage of the proceedings will be extensive. She noted the possibility of one or more jurors being exposed to prejudicial information and that the saturation of coverage will make it difficult for the court to control juror’s access to prejudicial information. I reject this reason as an adequate basis for limiting coverage of a trial by the electronic media. Instructions to the jury and the jurors’ adherence to those instructions must provide the protection. A juror’s seeing again what happened before him or her in the courtroom would not be as bad as a juror’s seeing, reading, and hearing comment and opinions about the evidence and the trial. The latter cannot be controlled by limiting television and radio coverage of the trial. I agree with the judge that “constant replay and analysis of every aspect of the trial” has potential to interfere with a juror’s ability to render a verdict based solely on the evidence at trial. The cure is jury adherence to the judge’s instructions not to watch, listen to, or read about the trial until the case is over. The judge stated other reasons for her decision to deny television coverage of the trial. The defendant has displayed disruptive behavior during court proceedings in attempting to communicate with the media. The presence of cameras in the courtroom, the judge concluded, might encourage the defendant “to continue to use the proceedings as a forum to air his views on abortion and other issues.” This special circumstance, not unique but relatively rare, is entitled to considerable weight. This problem of disruptive behavior applies throughout the trial. The concern about disruptive behavior is not speculative. The motion judge has witnessed such events in the course of pretrial proceedings at which electronic media were present. The judge also relied on the fact that media coverage would increase the risk of harm to material witnesses, surviving victims, and the families of the deceased victims. These people, the judge found, had justifiably heightened fears of harassment and physical attack by misguided viewers. This circumstance, where the case involves crimes apparently committed because of the defendant’s reaction to the performance of abortions, is entitled to weight in deciding whether to allow electronic recording that affects such people. The motion judge, however, did not spell out in detail why the concerns of these people required the entire proceeding to be closed to the electronic media. Electronic media may be denied the right to record trial proceedings only if that coverage will create a substantial likelihood of harm to someone or a substantial likelihood of a serious harmful consequence. The defendant and the prosecution both concur that such a substantial likelihood exists in this case, but neither each one alone nor both together can control the decision. The judge has made a specific finding of a substantial likelihood of harm to the defendant and his right to a fair trial. If that finding depends on the possibility of improper extra judicial influences on jurors, it cannot stand. Because it stands on the basis of other considerations, the judge’s conclusion is warranted. As a single justice I should not interfere with the judge’s ruling unless it was wrong as a matter of law or the judge abused her discretion. Because of the strong emotions and reactions that the “abortion” question generates in this country, as the circumstances of this very case demonstrates, because of the expressed concerns of persons who might be harmed, and because of the potential for disruptive behavior, the judge, after making necessary findings, did not abuse her discretion in concluding that the trial should be closed to electronic recording. I see no error of law in the judge’s rulings that requires or permits me to vacate her order. The controlling canon does not expressly oblige the judge to adopt the least restrictive means of achieving protection of the concerned witnesses and others. Implicitly, however, the rule requires a limitation or suspension of media coverage only to the extant necessary to eliminate the substantial likelihood of harm or other serious consequence. The electronic media have suggested procedures by which, in their view, the concerns of those people can be protected while not excluding the electronic media from the courtroom. The trial judge has discretion in such matters once the appropriate findings are made. See Boston Herald, Inc. v. Superior Court Dept. of the Trial Court, 421 Mass. 502, 507 n.8 (1995). There is no means of avoiding the possibility of disruptive behavior by the defendant through some less than total elimination of electronic recording. The threat will exist throughout the trial. The circumstances of People v. Simpson in California should not be permitted to influence the operation of our Massachusetts rule. I see no indication that it has in this case. It would be instructive to record electronically how an able Massachusetts judge conducts a high publicity trial, but in the circumstances the trail judge was warranted in her discretion in barring the electronic media from the courtroom in this case. The judge’s order is always open for reconsideration by her in light of this memorandum or if circumstances change. I emphasize that this case presents special circumstances that warrant the closing of the entire trial to the electronic media, in the judge’s discretion: an established pattern of disruptive conduct by the defendant and a basis for concluding that there is a substantial likelihood of harm to witnesses, surviving victims, and others. What I have said should be considered in the light of (1) a rule whose strong presumption is that no media will be excluded from the courtroom and (2) the necessity to make findings of fact that support the exemption stated in the relevant rule. A judgment shall be entered denying relief under G.L. c. 211, sect. 3. Herbert P. Wilkins Associate Justice February 1, 1996 t in the circumstances the trialўџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџ.+,CVefWX\]|}”•ЈЉpqNOœ  }~./ѕі‡ˆ@A‘’‰ŠбвгдеўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ў Р! ўР! ў Р! ўР! ў Р! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ў Р! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! -ежзъќ§ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! ўР! K@ёџNormala c"A@ђџЁ"Default Paragraph Fontџџџџџџџџ џџ џџ џџœŽР! .е Emil FreundA:\WILKINS.TXTџ@HP LaserJet 4/4MLPT1:HPPCL5EHP LaserJet 4/4M  Dзќџˆыб@ џXHP LaserJet 4/4M  Dзќџˆыб@ џX€cc––cC4Cc c 1Times New Roman Symbol &Arial"ˆаhІwІZІ6ƒ$GCOMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS Emil Freund Emil FreundŸ„~CONTROL INF `Ÿ “LDDEML DLL `ŸІDRIVERS CPL `ŸЏрЁDSWAP EXE `ŸСRkMCISEQ DRV `ŸѓАbMCIWAVE DRV `ŸњnMIDIMAP DRV `Ÿ0ЮMMSYSTEMDLL `Ÿа№OLECLI DLL `Ÿ^FOLESVR DLL `Ÿs^SHELL DLL `Ÿ)€ЂSYSEDIT EXE `ŸLаI